Abstract: In this paper we develop a model to value debt related tax savings and associated yield rates for debt in a setting where future cash flows are uncertain and follow a stochastic diffusion process. By explicitly modeling a default trigger we find that tax shield values in standard Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) valuation formulas are too high as they do not correctly incorporate the risk of default. Furthermore, we are able to endogenously derive risk-adjusted yield rates, while keeping the overall simple and tractable structure of the DCF approach.
Introduction
Since Miller (1958, 1963) and Miles and Ezzell (1985) the valuation of corporate tax shields is one of the most prominent components of the Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) and capital budgeting literature. While Graham (2000) highlighted that the capitalized tax benefits are in practice a significant proportion of firm value, the correct valuation of these tax benefits is subject to an ongoing academic debate. One recent example is the discussion on the slicing approach to value the tax shield Liu (2009) and Qi (2011) . Besides this, there are several articles dealing with misunderstandings about the correct formulas to value the tax shield (see for example the discussion between Fernandez (2004) , Fieten et al. (2005) , Arzac and Glosten (2005) and Cooper and Nyborg (2006) as well as the more recent discussion between Massari, Roncaglio, and Zanetti (2007) and Dempsey (2013) .
In contrast to this extensive discussion relatively few articles deal with the incorporation of risky debt considering a possible default. Among the few works Cooper and Nyborg (2008) analyzed the impact of default and the taxation of a cancelation of indebtedness (COD) on the tax-adjusted discount rates and in turn indirectly on the tax savings. Molnár and Nyborg (2013) extended this analysis towards a more general approach considering partial default and the prioritization of interest or principal payments. A further approach aiming at the adjustment of the discount rate is given by Koziol (2014) . He proposes a framework to adjust the weighted average cost of capital by accounting for an exogenously assumed default probability and possible bankruptcy costs.
Despite the insights and important results gained through the discussion of risky debt and firm valuation, there remains an important drawback: The models ask for a variety of exogenously assumed parameters such as the probability of default, the yield rate or an ex ante assumption regarding the discount rate. Having to rely on exogenous parameters is specifically an issue or disadvantage for firms where access to such data is limited or the data for the respective parameters is simply unavailable (e. g. for small and midsized entities or unlisted firms). As a consequence, the determined tax-adjusted discount rates heavily rely on the assumed parameters which are often only a rough approximation and might not even reflect the actual firm characteristics such as the business risk or growth prospects.
Our aim is to develop a framework under the simplifying but reality approximating assumption of a constant leverage financing policy as proposed by Miles and Ezzell (1980) and Miles and Ezzell (1985) . We want to link the specific firm characteristics with the default risk and quantify the impact of the tax shield value. We base our model on the famous adjusted present value (APV) approach by Myers (1974) and integrate the risk of default as a factor into the period specific tax savings. In order to determine the impact of default we explicitly model the default event by an illiquidity trigger, i. e. the cash flow test. A default is triggered in case the cash flow fails to meet the debt service (see for an equivalent proposal e. g. Kim, Ramaswamy, and Sundaresan (1993) or Kruschwitz and Loffler (2006) ). The cash flow test has been recently confirmed as an appropriate test for insolvency in a decision by the 9th circuit of the US Supreme Court on the 28th of June 2013 (see the matter of Marshall III, No. 09-55573, 2013 WL 3242478) .
The explicit formulation of a default trigger enables us to use methodologies from option pricing for obtaining pricing equations which can be applied in practical valuation settings and help us to gain additional insights between risk and growth prospects of the cash flows of a firm, the risk of default and the tax savings. Thereby, we contribute to the existing literature stream on tax shield valuation but take a different approach by explicitly modelling the default event in a constant leverage framework.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the basic model setup and all relevant assumptions. In Section 3 we derive the valuation formula for the risk adjusted discount rates for the expected value of debt and the debt related tax savings. Section 4 provides a numerical example of our model as well as a sensitivity analysis. Section 5 concludes the paper.
Discussion of Model Assumptions
Within the following subsections we present and explain the relevant assumptions for our model. This is done with respect to the existing literature as well as the most typical legal regulations with implications for practical valuation problems. We proceed by introducing first the underlying cash flow process and the time scale. The next subsection covers generally valid valuation procedures and discusses our choice for a specific financing policy. Afterwards, our choice of an endogeneous default trigger is presented. Since this is central to our model, we explain how this relates to other models that use exogenous default triggers. Furthermore, we argue that our default trigger illiquidity is the most relevant from a legal perspective. Finally, we consider what happens during default, that is we introduce bankruptcy costs and discuss consequences of default for the valuation of the tax shield.
The General Model Setting
Let Ω, F , P ð Þ be a probability space and ½0, T a time interval. The available information at time t, with t 2 ½0, T, is denoted by the filtration F t . We make the assumption of a perfect, arbitrage-free capital market. Furthermore, there exists a to P equivalent probability measure Q called the risk-neutral probability measure. Consider a levered firm whose value in t is denoted by V L t . The value of the levered firm is according to the APV approach identical to the value of the otherwise identical but unlevered firm V U t plus the value of the tax shield V TS t .
1
The firm's operations generate in every period t, which usually corresponds to one fiscal year, an uncertain free cash flow stream FCF U t . The unlevered cost of equity are denoted by r u . Debt-and equityholders are faced with the firm's risk of default; thus, the debtholders receive on outstanding debt D t in period t a 1 See for example Myers (1974) .
The Impact of Default on Tax Shield Valuation risk-adjusted (nominal) interest rate Y D, t . The risk-free rate r f and the corporate tax rate τ are certain and constant quantities for all periods.
The firms unlevered free cash flows are assumed to follow the subsequent stochastic process
where μ is the expected rate of return, σ the standard deviation and dW t a Brownian motion on the probability space Ω, F , P ð Þ . The geometric Brownian motion (GBM) defined in eq.
[1] is a continuous time stochastic process. In order to account for the typical discrete announcement of cash flow figures which are based upon the annual statement published by the firm, we divide the time interval t to T into N periods of length Δt, with Δt = T − t N . At the resulting discrete time points, s = t, t + 1, t + 2, ..., t + N, the then prevailing value of the unlevered free cash flows modelled by the GBM is observed and used for pricing the firm. With this explicit modelling the unlevered free cash flow between two arbitrary points in time t and t + 1 is
As we will show this procedure enables us on the one hand to develop the corresponding pricing equation in the well-known time-discrete form and on the other hand to use the computational benefits of a GBM, i. e. the computational efficiency of a normally distributed random variable. 
General Valuation Method
As outlined in the introduction we will perform a risk-neutral valuation procedure to avoid ex ante assumptions regarding the discount rates for valuing the levered firm. It is well known that a GBM under the risk-neutral probability measure Q is given by
where dW
σ . According to the martingale representation theorem (see Shreve 2004 ) the discounted FCF U -process is a martingale under Q . This enables us to price any asset or derivative using the risk-neutral valuation method. Using this procedure the levered firm value according to the APV approach under the risk-neural probability measure Q can be determined by
where TS t are the periodic specific debt related tax savings in any arbitrary period t. This equation is valid for any arbitrary financing policy. In order to explicitly state the tax shield equation or periodic specific debt related tax savings it is necessary to assume a specific financing policy. For the remainder of this article we analyze a reality approximating simplified financing policy. We consider a constant leverage financing policy, where the leverage ratio, defined as debt to value ratio (l =
, is a certain (non-stochastic) and constant quantity for all future periods (see Ezzell (1980) and (1985) or Arzac and Glosten (2005) ).
3 This financing policy implicitly assumes that the firm raises the amount of debt D t at time t and raises or redeems the difference between the corresponding debt value D t + 1 in t + 1, Δ D t, t + 1 = D t − D t + 1 , where the respective amounts of debt are chosen according to the leverage ratio. Since future amounts of debt are uncertain with regard to the filtration F t this implies that all future periodic specific debt related tax savings are uncertain as well according to
The valuation of a levered firm subject to a possible default is sensitive to the proposed assumptions. Assumptions such as the treatment of a default by the tax authority or assumptions regarding the capital structure after a default cause changes in the respective valuation formulas. In order to account for these reality-based assumptions we carefully discuss the modeling and valuation implications. For calculating the tax shield value we specify in the subsequent sections the payoffs for the debtholders and the tax shield. We start with the assumptions about the firm and continue with those regarding the tax authority. Furthermore, we derive the pricing equations considering a possible default where the case of risk-free debt is a special case.
As in most firm valuation settings we will consider a limited liability firm. The equityholders are not responsible for the liabilities of the levered firm. We further assume that the firm has no significant cash reserves. Without any closer consideration this assumption seems rather counterintuitive but as a matter of fact the DCF approach aims at determining the enterprise value of a levered firm, i. e. the value of debt plus equity. Therefore, we are interested in the default risk of the cash flow generating (operating) assets (see for example the standard corporate valuation textbooks as Koller, Goedhart, and Wessels 2005) . Introducing cash into our model will therefore only decrease the probability of default but will otherwise not drastically alter our results. Interconnected to this assumption we perceive that the firm pursues a full distribution policy. In the context of a possible default it is useful to highlight the consequences of the constant leverage financing policy in more detail. The firm chooses its total amount of debt in an arbitrary period t according to the well-known relation
By imposing a constant leverage ratio we implicitly assume that the firm's financing decisions are isolated from the event of default and should be regarded as exogenously given.
4 Therefore, the total amount of debt the firm chooses to borrow in an arbitrary period t is determined by
Note that D t is thereby just a linear function of the unlevered free cash flows. 
Endogeneous Default Trigger
The standard approach proposed by the literature stream is to discuss the effects of a default without defining a specific default trigger (see e. g. Cooper and Nyborg (2008) , Molnár and Nyborg (2013) or Koziol (2014) ). Koziol (2014) highlights the importance to include default within the DCF approach. He notes that in the literature stream on optimal capital structure, e. g. Leland (1994) , the default risk has been included for a long time. He therefore extends the standard WACC approach to a setting where an exogenous default probability p is introduced and develops a model based on an expected cash flow conditional on default. While we do not consider a WACC approach we extend this idea further by endogenizing default. An exogenous default directly implies that the event constituting a default remains undefined and that any incorporation of the risk of default has to be purely driven by exogenously given parameters such as the probability of default or the yield rate. This procedure has the following drawbacks: (1) The probability of 4 Notice that this assumption unifies within the DCF literature stream approaches considering the risk of default. 5 For the derivation see appendix A.
default is not based upon the firm specific parameters underlying the valuation model such as in our setting μ and σ. (2) The contractually fixed yield rate Y D t has to be exogenously assumed as well and might not fit the true default probability implied by the firm's characteristics. Obtaining a yield rate which is determined by a decisional calculus of the debtholders offers a more precise picture. (3) Since the chosen yield rate is obviously an important factor in determining the tax savings, exogenously assuming it might bias the tax savings as well. Again, the calculated tax savings might then not fit to the firm characteristics. Obviously, for firms having publicly available data on their debt this issue might be less important. But, for often unlisted small-and midsized entities this might be an extremely important issue. Even for listed firms these issues might arise when the access to data with respect to the yield rate or ratings is limited or simply not available for an external analyst. In summary, firms default in practice due to cash flow problems. Thus we consider it a natural choice to model default as an endogenous event as well.
Defining an adequate default trigger serving both the typical cash flow oriented perspective of the discounted cash flow approach and practical applicable provisions is an important step in our analysis. Most bankruptcy codes distinguish between the so called balance sheet test (overextension), i. e. the firm's debt outvalues its assets measured at a fair value, and the cash flow test (illiquidity), i. e. the firm is unable to pay its contractually fixed obligations by its cash flows. We consider a constant leverage financing policy, where the leverage ratio l 2 0, 1 ½ . Therefore, the balance sheet test is not a realisitc scenario whitin our setting. Hence, as outlined below we consider the cash flow test as the generally most natural assumption for our model also from a regulatory perspective. As noted by the 9 th circuit of the US supreme court on the 28 th of June 2013 in the matter of Marshall III, No. 09-55573, 2013 WL 3242478 , the cash flow test according to section 101(32)(C) of the US bankruptcy code would be a more appropriate default trigger for firms filing for chapter 11. Moreover, this default criterion comprises the cash flow oriented perspective of the DCF approach and is consistent to the fact that several bond indenture provisions constituting a default are cash flow oriented (see e. g. the discussion in Kim, Ramaswamy, and Sundaresan (1993) )). Due to these reasons we regard illiquidity as the default trigger in our analysis. The levered firm has to settle its debt obligations (i. e. interest payments plus redemption or raise of debt) in t + 1 by its levered free cash flows FCF 
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This default trigger 6 implies that the firm defaults as soon as it cannot pay the after tax interests on debt and the debt redemption (if ΔD t, t + 1 > 0) by its unlevered free cash flows. In particular eq.
[5] reveals that ð1 − τÞY D, t D t + D t has to be paid by the free cash flows of t + 1 and the new debt outstanding in t + 1. This statement is identical to stating that the firm defaults as soon as the cash flow to equity holders becomes negative (ECF t < 0), i. e. the equity holders would have to inject cash into the firm for preventing default. In practice and in the literature stream on the impact of default risk (see e. g. Kim, Ramaswamy, and Sundaresan (1993) ) or implicitly Kruschwitz and Loffler (2006) ) it is often discussed that the firm might sell parts of its assets to prevent a default by paying down the lacking amount of the debt obligations. By including such a scenario into the proposed model we would definitely alter the investment policy of the firm, the cash flow generating assets and in turn the unlevered free cash flows that are exogenously modelled by a GBM (see eq.
[1]). Moreover, in a setting without any information asymmetries, excluding the deviation from an optimal investment policy follows the spirit of the very wellknown conditions of the Modigliani-Miller model. Figure 1 highlights the structure of our general model setting so far in a visual way. We have a continuous time stochastic cash flow process with 6 See for a similar default trigger Kruschwitz and Loffler (2006) . discrete observations, i. e. rebalancing points. In case the cash flow is higher than interest and changes of the debt level due to the constant leverage financing policy the firm continues its operations. If the cash flow is below this threshold level at a rebalancing point the firm defaults due to our default trigger illiquidity. As we will show later on, our model measures at each observation point the distance to default in an option pricing framework.
Default and Treatment of the Tax Shield
After the occurrence of a default it is important to outline how the remaining assets of the firm are distributed among the claimholders of the firm, i. e. debt and equityholders as well as the tax authority. We continue on the classical assumption that the firm is costlessly taken over by the debtholders and the equityholders are left with nothing.
In order to capture the negative effects of a possible default we introduce bankruptcy costs similar to the standard capital structure models (see for example Leland (1994) or Goldstein, Ju, and Leland (2001))). In the case of default a fraction 1 − α of V U t , with 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, is lost due to costs of financial distress, 7 implying an unlevered firm value after default of V U, B t + 1 = αV U t . We defined the default trigger illiquidity, which is purely driven by the cash flow. Thus, in the case of default the outstanding value of the firm might be higher than the value of debt obligation comprising the interest and principal payments. In order to rule out such a scenario we derive in appendix 7 the limits of the payoff of the debtholders by finding an appropriate condition for α. In the case the condition given in eq.
[30] holds the debtholders would receive full recovery and the debt issue has to be regarded as risk-free. We control for such cases in the remainder of the analysis.
Since the debtholders take over the firm after the occurrence of a default, the tax savings disappear. By proceeding on this assumption our analysis is consistent with the existing literature (see e. g. Leland (1994) , Couch, Dothan, and Wu (2012) ) among others). Obviously, as outlined by other works dealing with default risk such as Leland (1994) or recently within the DCF setting Koziol (2014) the debtholders might sell the firm to a new equity investor. This new investor could inject additional equity into the defaulted firm in order to 7 As shown by several empirical studies indirect bankruptcy costs account in comparison to the direct bankruptcy costs for a significant amount of the value loss of bankrupt firms. (See Altman (1984) or for a more recent study Reimund, Schwetzler, and Zainhofer (2009) ).
The Impact of Default on Tax Shield Valuation restructure the firm in a way that it might carry debt again in order achieve tax savings once more. The proposed approach yields the possibility to map such scenarios as well.
A default has an important tax consequence with respect to the tax treatment of a possible cancellation of indebtedness (COD). Depending on the jurisdictions tax code a COD might give rise to a tax liability (see e. g. for the US IRC section 61(a)(12)). More commonly, several tax codes grant an exception from tax on a COD (see e. g. for the US IRC section 108(a)(1)(A) or for Germany x 227 AO, and the letter by the German financial ministry as of the 27th of March 2003; BFH decision as of the 14th of June 2010, X R 34/08). According to these rules the exception of a taxation of a COD can be regarded as granted for firms aiming at restructuring their business for continuing their operations. By following the assumption that the taxation of a COD is exempted the proposed model is in line with the tax code of several jurisdictions and consistent to the existing literature (see e. g. Miller (1991) , Kruschwitz and Loffler (2006) or Cooper and Nyborg (2008) ).
Debt and Tax Shield Valuation in a Miles/Ezzell Environment with Default
Now, we focus on the implications of the proposed assumptions and derive our model based on this. Summarizing the discussion of the previous section we have the following model setup which implies a specific payoff structure for the tax savings and the debtholders (see Table 1 ): Whether the firm defaults or not in an arbitrary period t + 1 depends on whether the default condition given in eq.
[6] has been triggered or not. In case FCF disappear, the tax authority grants an exception from a taxation of a COD and the firm suffers bankruptcy costs amounting to ð1 − αÞV U t + 1 . The debtholders realize the generated cash flow FCF U t + 1 and take over the firm with a remaining value of V U, B t + 1 . By ruling out the case that the firm value obtained by the debtholders exceeds ð1 + Y D, t ÞD t via determining a corresponding α we do not incur a situation where default occurs and the remaining firm value is higher than the payment to the debtholders in the no default state. In case these two payoffs are the same the debt in our model is risk free and therefore the debtholders will charge a Y D, t equal to the risk free rate (see for a discussion of this issue Kim, Ramaswamy, and Sundaresan (1993) ). Thus we can caputure with our model the full range of potential losses that the firm can potentially face, by controlling for α.
The Value of Debt
In this section, we regard the perspective of the debtholders. Using contingent claim analysis we derive a pricing equation that enables us to determine the contractually fixed interest rate Y D, t taking into account their payoff as depicted in Table 1 . In this respect, the default trigger as given in eq.
[6] and the condition for α as derived in appendix 7 play an important role, and therefore are incorporated in the derivation.
Following the constant leverage financing policy the firm issues in an arbitrary period t according to eq. [4] the total amount of debt D t .
8 The debtholders base their calculation of Y D, t upon the expected repayment payoff in t + 1, considering a possible risk that the firm will default. By using Table 1 the state-dependent payoff of the debtholders (POD t + 1 ) is given by
In order to find a pricing equation that enables us to determine Y D, t subject to the constant leverage financing policy, condition [6] , and the payoff in the default state, one must first find an expression for D t + 1 since this is a stochastic variable in t and second find an explicit formulation for V U, B t + 1 . We can compute in t an expected value for D t + 1 by using eq. [4] which enables us to rewrite [6] to 8 Notice that D s , with s > t, is a stochastic variable. However, a determination of E Q ½D s jF t using eq. [4] is still possible.
The Impact of Default on Tax Shield Valuation
where
The payoff of the debtholders in the default state by finding a relation for V U, B t + 1 can be rewritten to
Thus, the payoff of the debtholders in the case of default is a multiple M of the unlevered free cash flow that includes potential losses due to bankruptcy costs.
9
The default trigger as given in eq.
[8] can be compared to the strike of a standard European option: The firm defaults in the case where FCF U t + 1 is smaller than the strike K = 1 γ t + 1 ð1 − τÞY D, t D t + D t and in the remaining case continues its operations.
In the remainder of this subsection, we derive a pricing equation for the payoff of the debtholders. For this purpose we combine eqs [7] and [10] to find the present value of the (expected) payoff of the debtholders [7] , which yields
where f Q ðFCF U t + 1 Þ denotes the density of FCF U t + 1 . By noting that all values below zero ð − ∞, 0 are irrelevant for our considerations and splitting the integral in two parts we may write
9 In appendix 7 we derive a condition for α that shows when debtholders receive full recovery in the case of default. Thus, allowing us to rule out the possibility of a full recovery by finding an appropriate α. As aforementioned, otherwise, the debt obligations have to be evaluated as if they were risk free.
where f Q ðFCF U t + 1 Þ denotes the density function of FCF U t + 1 . Following appendix 8 the solution of eq. [13] and therefore the value of debt considering a possible default and a constant leverage financing policy is given by
This valuation formula enables us to derive the (nominal) interest Y D, t that the debtholders charge based upon E Q ½D t = D t in order to get compensated for the default risk.
The Payoff of the Tax Shield
In this section, we first discuss the payoff of the tax shield for both the no default and the default scenario. Second, we derive a valuation equation based upon our findings which enables us to find the correct discount rate. We assume the scenario that after default the firm continues its operations all equity financed. Such a scenario usually occurs by a debt-to-equity swap or through the principles of the bankruptcy proceedings. Taking these preconditions and the default trigger outlined in eq.
[5] into account, the payoff of the tax shield is given by
With this explicit tax shield payoff in the case of default, we imply that the debtholders either continue operating the defaulted firm or sell the operating
The Impact of Default on Tax Shield Valuation assets to a new equity investor. For example after selling the firm to a new equity investor and restructuring, the firm could continue to pursue a constant leverage financing policy. Nevertheless, the tax shield value for the debt-and equityholders before restructuring is in the case of default zero. Consequently, the payoff of the tax shield differs from that of the debtholders. From the payoff of the tax shield given in [15] the present value can be calculated via
where again all values below zero ð − ∞, 0 are irrelevant for our considerations and f Q ðFCF U t + 1 Þ is again the density function of FCF U t + 1 . After separating the integral by
we can make use of the fact that the second integral has a value of zero. The first integral is over a constant and has already been derived in appendix 8. We obtain for the value of the tax shield the following relation
where d 2 has been already determined in eq. [14] . This equation for valuing the tax shield considering default allows us to calculate the risk-adjusted tax shield value. The formula accounts for this by using Nðd 2 Þ, the probability that the firm does not default, multiplied with the period specific tax deductible interest payments based upon the contractually fixed interest rate Y D, t . This interest rate is determined upon our considerations in Section 3.1. By comparing eq. [18] with the standard DCF tax shield formula for a constant leverage financing
; (see Miles and Ezzell (1985) in combination with Molnár and Nyborg (2013)), we observe that the tax shield increases with the probability for survival.
Implications for the Valuation of the Tax Shield
In this section we determine the impact of a default according to the specified trigger in eq.
[5] on the value of the tax shield. We calculate the present value of debt E Q D t ½ considering a constant leverage financing policy and the payoff of the debtholders. Finally, we compare the calculated value of the tax shield with its potential values according to the classical tax shield formulas of Miles and Ezzell (1985) and draw conclusions for the discount rate of the tax shield.
In order to highlight the impact of default on the value of the tax shield we provide a numerical example throughout this section. We analyze a firm with a limited lifetime of T = 15 and an initial free cash flow in t of 100. The growth rate under Q is equal to the risk-free rate and amounts to 3%, g Q = r f = 0.03. The firm targets a constant leverage ratio of l = 0.25, which is an intertemporal average estimate for firms operating in the G7 states.
10 Additionally, we assume a standard deviation of the free cash flows of σ = 0.15, depicting thereby a moderate fluctuation of the firm's free cash flows. The corporate tax rate is assumed to be constant and amounts to τ = 35%. We start our analysis by calculating the value of debt according to [4] . For the aforementioned parameters E Q ½D t amounts to 382.76. It is now possible to compare the results from [4] to that of [14] , where both equations must strictly yield the same result. Equation [14] incorporates the potential risk of default and the associated losses. Therefore, the debtholders will be compensated for the associated default risk by an appropriate contractually fixed interest rate Y D, t .
From a technical perspective we notice that we cannot easily rearrange eq. [14] for Y D, t due to the cumulative normal distributions. Nevertheless, a numerical solution can be easily calculated. For the parameters of our initial example the debtholders would set Y D, t = 7.2605%.
11 The tax shield value subject to a possible default and loss of future tax shields given in eq.
[18] amounts to 382.76 Á 0.83978 = 7.93. [19] For the parameters of the initial example the standard DCF value of the tax shield V TS, ME without the explicit modelling of default amounts to 10 See for example Rajan and Zingales (1995) . 11 This solution can be easily obtained via bisection. 12 Notice that the application of the tax shield formula according to Sick (1990) (taxes on debt relief apply) yields a value of τrf Dt 1 + rf = 3.9.
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In the next step, we calculate the respective discount rate for the tax shield via the following return equation
Thereby, we assume that the discount rate is defined as a conditional expected return. In the example, the resulting discount rate for the tax shield subject to default is calculated by r TS = 0.35 Á 0.072605 Á 382.76 7.93 − 1 = 0.2266.
[22] Table 2 shows the sensitivity of the yield rate and the tax shield for different recovery rates α and various firm characteristics. The corresponding values in the table highlight the endogeneous nature of default in our model. The tax shield and the yield rate Y D, t depend on the probability that the firm will default as well as the loss given default. With this numerical example we can demonstrate how the specific default risk of the firm directly relates to its correct valuation. Firm specifics
In a final step we want to compare the tax shield value based on the tax shield equation [18] to the classical formula by Miles and Ezzell (1985) and the more recent extension of it by Molnár and Nyborg (2013) .
13 Table 3 yields the results of this comparison. Note that for α = -1 and δ = 0 the formula by Molnár and Nyborg (2013) converges to the formula by Miles and Ezzell (1985) . The difference between their result and ours comes from the fact that with our model we capture the endogenous relationship between probability of default, loss given default and yield promised to the debtholders.
A problem of the formula by Molnár and Nyborg (2013) is that it cannot capture the limit case of a full recovery, in which case their tax shield value is not defined. Yet, the case of a full recovery implies a riskless interest rate which would make the tax shield value defined and positive. On the contrary, in our approach the promised yield to the debtholders converges towards the risk-free rate and the tax shield value is positive. For very small leverage levels the promised yield Y D, t converges to the risk free rate since default is unlikely and in the event of default the debtholders can be fully repaid. Nevertheless, the tax shield value is non-zero due to the interest payments. For higher levels of leverage debt becomes risky, reflected by a promised yield higher than the risk free rate.
Conclusion
In this article we derive a general model for tax shield valuation considering the possibility of default under a constant leverage financing policy. The general Molnár and Nyborg (2013) to ours we adapt the value of α as recovery rates between 0 and 1, where their alpha is negative and inverse to ours.
The Impact of Default on Tax Shield Valuation formula models the possibility of a default by explicitly using the default trigger illiquidity. By doing so, we endogenously determine the possibility of default without imposing any assumption with respect to an exogenous given probability of default. Based upon the probability of default or inversely stated, the probability to survive, the contractually fixed interest on debt for compensating the debtholders is computed. This is important, because the promised yield should fit to the firm's implied probability of default for practical valuation purposes. Additionally, we have shown how to calculate the risk-adjusted discount rate for the valuation of tax shields. The presented tax shield valuation formula is equal to the standard DCF tax shield formula for the case of no possibility of default or a firm where the default is costless for the debtholders. In this case the promised yield corresponds to the risk free rate.
However, for the case of a risky firm, we have illustrated in a simple DCF setting how to endogenously determine the probability of default, the implied interest on debt and the tax shield value subject to default.
Derivation of the Risk-Neutral Levered Firm Value
In order to determine an expression for the V L t under the risk-neutral probability measure Q we start with the value of a levered firm under Q : If the condition holds the debtholders will charge the risk free interest rate Y D, t = r f as they will receive full recovery in bankruptcy and non-bunkruptcy states.
Derivation of the Integrals
For solving the two integrals given in eq. [13] it is important to note 1. In the first term ð1 + Y D, t Þ Á D t is in t a constant and therefore can be factored out. 
